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Abstract: Recent projections of energy intensity predict a more rapid decline in intensity 
than has occurred in the recent past. To assess how well such projections have performed in 
the past, I assess the accuracy of the business as usual energy intensity projections embedded 
in the annual World Energy Outlook (WEO) produced by the International Energy Agency 
since 1994. Changes in energy intensity depend on economic growth, and historical errors in 
projecting energy intensity can partly be explained by errors in projecting the rate of 
economic growth. However, recent projections of the elasticity of energy intensity with 
respect to economic growth probably overstate the likely future reduction in energy intensity 
even if economic growth is projected accurately. This could be because energy efficiency 
policies are not implemented as effectively as expected or because the economy-wide 
rebound effect is larger than modeling assumes. 
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Introduction 
The future development of energy intensity – the ratio of energy use to gross domestic 
product (GDP) – is of interest both for projecting future energy demand based on projections 
of economic growth and, as one of the factors in the Kaya Identity, future greenhouse gas 
emissions. Marangoni et al. (2017) show that energy intensity is one of the two more 
important Kaya factors – the rate of economic growth is the other. If we are over-optimistic 
about the potential for limiting the increase in energy use under business as usual (BAU), 
climate policy may be weaker than it needs to be. Various researchers and organizations 
routinely project future energy intensity. Recent projections tend to predict faster future 
reduction in energy intensity than has occurred in recent history. The IPCC 5th Assessment 
Report integrates projections from many different models (Clarke et al. 2014 Figure 6.1) 
finding that 95% of models predict that energy intensity will decline more rapidly than in the 
past. The 2016 World Energy Outlook (WEO-2016) also projects more rapid decline in 
energy intensity in the future under the “Current Policies” scenario than has occurred in the 
last couple of decades (Figure 1).1 Here, I investigate how well the WEO has projected 
changes in energy intensity to date and evaluate the prospects for achieving such a rapid 
decline in the future. 
The mean rate of decline of world energy intensity from 1990 to 2015 was 1.46% p.a. (Figure 
1). WEO-2016’s Current Policies projection sees energy intensity declining by 2.09% p.a. till 
2020 and by 2.13% p.a. between 2020 and 2030, after which the rate moderates to 1.7% p.a.2 
Energy intensity did decline more rapidly than this in a few recent years during the later years 
of economic booms. But these were exceptions. In the immediate aftermath of the Great 
Recession of 2008-9, energy intensity actually increased, and its decline was quite slow in the 
early part of the previous boom too (Jotzo et al. 2012). The New Policies scenario expects 
                                                
1 Following IEA practice, I refer to each annual WEO by attaching the date of publication 
with a hyphen. The “Current Policies” scenario assumes that only energy and climate change 
policies that are already implemented will be in place in the future. The IEA’s “New Policies” 
scenario assumes that other policies that have been announced but not yet implemented will 
be implemented. In WEO-2016 this includes policies that countries agreed to as part of the 
Paris Climate Change Accord (IEA, 2016) 
2 IEA makes projections for the level of energy use for a number of specific years in the 
future – in WEO-2016: 2020, 2030, and 2040 for the Current Policies scenario. I derived 
these rates of change in energy intensity from IEA’s stated assumptions on the future rate of 
economic growth and their projections of the level of energy use at these future dates. IEA 
makes both global and regional projections. Here, I only analyze the global projections. 
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more rapid decline still in future energy intensity.  
Though the projected rate of decline under BAU is more rapid than that in the recent past, 
this does not mean that such a rate of decline is impossible. Perhaps there are good reasons 
why the decline should accelerate. How well have past projections matched subsequent 
reality? The WEO provides a good case study, as the IEA has published the WEO annually 
since 1993 (with the exception of 1997) and most editions contain a Baseline, BAU, 
Reference, or Current Policies projection of world economic growth and energy use. I 
analyze projections of economic growth and energy use in all WEOs published since 1994, 
which are available online, to find out how well they have projected energy intensity to date. 
Of course, the IEA has always warned that real world developments may turn out differently 
to what they expected at the time of projection (IEA, 1994 to 2016). Still, it is important to 
know if there is a systematic bias in these projections rather than simply random forecast 
errors. 
Projections vs. Actual Outcomes 
Researchers have previously assessed how well the WEO has projected developments in solar 
PV and other renewable energy technologies (Metayer et al. 2015) and how well IPCC 
reports have projected carbon dioxide emissions intensity (Pretis and Roser 2016).3 Metayer 
et al. (2015) analyze projections in all WEOs from 1994 to 2014. They find that the growth of 
solar technologies and wind energy has been consistently strongly underestimated, suggesting 
that there could be systematic biases in the underlying modeling. 
The IEA also assessed past WEO projections for OECD primary energy demand and world 
oil demand (IEA 2000). They found that from WEO-1993 to WEO-1995 they underestimated 
OECD energy demand to 2000 while WEO-1996 and WEO-1998 overestimated it. The 
cumulative deviations by 2000 were, however, small – ranging from about -1.5% to +0.75%. 
Figure 2 shows, for each WEO, the difference between the actual annual rate of change of 
energy intensity and its projected rate of change in subsequent years. Positive deviations 
indicate that energy intensity declined by less (in absolute value) than it was projected to, so 
that the level of energy intensity was higher than projected in 2015 (2010 for WEO-1994 to 
WEO-1996) and vice versa. Intensity declined more slowly in following years than WEO-
                                                
3 Other studies such as Aleklett et al.’s (2010) review of WEO-2008’s projection for world oil 
production do not compare projections to actual outcomes. 
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1994 to WEO-1996 projected. Then from WEO-1998 to WEO-2003 energy intensity declined 
much faster in subsequent years than projected. Finally, from WEO-2004, with the exception 
of WEO-2014, the projections have been over-optimistic about the rate of decline in energy 
intensity. 
It turns out that the correlation between these cumulative projection errors and the respective 
cumulative projection errors in GDP is -0.8. Csereklyei et al. (2016) show that the rate of 
change in energy intensity is negatively correlated with the rate of economic growth and that 
in the absence of economic growth energy intensity tends to increase slowly. As IEA uses 
external projections of GDP growth, a better assessment of the performance of the 
projections would remove the effect of economic growth. 
Decomposing Projections 
We can use an identity decomposition to investigate the role of economic growth rate 
projections in projections of energy intensity. Denote the growth rate of energy intensity by 𝑔 𝐸/𝑌 , where E is global energy use, Y is total GDP, and 𝑔 .  is the average percentage 
growth rate over a given period. Then multiplying and dividing 𝑔 𝐸/𝑌  by the growth rate of 
GDP, 𝑔 𝑌 , we have: 
 𝑔 𝐸/𝑌 ≡ 𝑔 𝐸/𝑌𝑔 𝑌 𝑔 𝑌  (1) 
The term 𝑔 𝐸/𝑌 /𝑔 𝑌  can be seen as the elasticity of energy intensity with respect to 
economic growth assuming that the rate of decline in energy intensity is zero in the absence 
of economic growth. Figure 3 presents actual and projected 𝑔 𝐸/𝑌 /𝑔 𝑌  from the base year 
of each WEO to either 2015 or 2010. The realized elasticity has increased (in absolute value) 
over time from around -0.3 to -0.6.4 The major changes in the elasticity are associated with 
events in 2010 when energy intensity increased (Figure 1). The projections of WEO-1994 to 
WEO-1996 end in 2010. Hence their realized elasticities are relatively small. 2010 is included 
in the projection periods for WEO-1998 to WEO-2011 but the following years up to 2015 are 
also included in the calculations of the elasticity. From WEO-2012 on, 2010 is no longer 
included in the projection period, and, as a result, there is a sharp increase in the realized 
elasticity. This suggests that the range of values from WEO-1998 to WEO-2011 is likely to be 
more representative of the long-run value of the elasticity. 
                                                
4 From here on, when comparing values of the elasticities, absolute values are assumed. 
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Figure 3 shows that WEO-1994 to WEO-1996 overestimated the elasticity. From 1998 to 
2001 the WEO estimated smaller elasticities, but these underestimated the actual elasticities. 
Since then, the projected elasticities have become larger. WEO-2009 to WEO-2011 
overestimated the elasticity, whose realized value was influenced by the increase in energy 
intensity in 2010. From 2012, that increase in energy intensity was no longer in the projection 
period, the realized elasticity increased, and WEO-2012 to WEO-2015 underestimated the 
elasticity. 
Figure 4 decomposes the errors in projected energy intensity in Figure 2 into the parts due to 
the error in projecting the elasticity and the error in the projected economic growth rate. I 
compute (1) for each projection period by substituting on the right hand side of (1) the 
projected elasticity for 𝑔 𝐸/𝑌 /𝑔 𝑌  but the actual realized growth rate of GDP for 𝑔 𝑌 .5 
The error in projecting energy intensity using this substituted formula is then the part of the 
total error due to the elasticity, and the remaining error is due to the growth rate. Through 
2001, the two components of the projection error are highly positively correlated (r = 0.995), 
while from 2002 to 2016 the correlation is -0.33. The correlation for the full period is 0.12. 
The mean absolute value of the two error components is similar, with the role of growth rate 
errors increasing relative to that of elasticity errors over time. 
Explaining Changes in the Projection Errors 
Explaining changes in the behavior of the elasticity projection error over time has to be 
somewhat speculative, but we can point to some potential factors. The number of variables 
about which assumptions are made in IEA’s modeling has changed over time, as has the 
number of explicit policies that the modelers have tried to take into account. In the earliest 
reports, the rate of economic growth, the future development of energy prices, the future 
development of energy efficiency in some sectors, future power generation capacity, and 
energy policies, in terms of taxes on energy, were all fed into the model that produced the 
energy use projection (IEA 1994, 1995, 1996). WEO-1998 was based on a new world energy 
model (WEM, IEA 1998). In particular, additions to power generation capacity were modeled 
as an outcome of an economic optimization decision. 
In WEO-2000 the BAU scenario was replaced with a Reference scenario that took into 
                                                
5 The decomposition results are only very slightly different if instead the projected growth 
rate is used together with the actual elasticity first and then the residual found.  
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account specific new energy and climate change policies in OECD countries (IEA, 2000). 
However, these changes do not have an apparent effect on the elasticity itself in Figure 3 or 
on the behavior of the elasticity projection error in Figure 4, which was highly correlated 
with errors in the rate of economic growth through WEO-2001. 
“The WEM underwent a major overhaul in 2004” (IEA 2006 p. 55), which was further 
extended in following years (IEA 2006, 2007). This allowed more detailed modeling of 
specific energy policies and measures (IEA, 2006). The 2004 revision coincides with larger 
positive elasticity projection errors in Figure 4 and an increase in the absolute value of the 
elasticity in Figure 3. In WEO-2008, “the integration of the WEM into a general equilibrium 
model, started in 2007, was taken a step further, in order to model more precisely the 
feedback links between energy markets and the macro-economy” (IEA 2008 p. 61). These 
changes do coincide with a marked increase in the projected elasticity in Figure 3. 
Subsequent reports (e.g. IEA 2011, 2013, 2014) increasingly emphasized that energy price 
projections were derived iteratively rather than being based completely on exogenous 
assumptions, but noted that the model was still a partial equilibrium model. 
As the actual elasticities in recent years are based on very short time series that do not include 
a recession, they are likely to overestimate the true elasticity. Csereklyei and Stern (2015) 
find that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the elasticity of energy use per capita with respect 
to GDP per capita increases with GDP per capita. Therefore, we should not necessarily 
expect the elasticity of interest here to decline over time. Instead, Csereklyei and Stern (2015) 
find that the slow growth of energy use in high income countries relative to upper middle 
income countries is mostly due to convergence effects – countries that were initially 
relatively energy intensive have converged in energy intensity with those that initially had 
relatively low energy intensity. It is likely, therefore, that since 2008 the WEO has 
overestimated the elasticities that will eventuate over the full projection horizons of 2030 to 
2040. 
The projected elasticities for recent years in Figure 3 actually understate the elasticities that 
IEA expects to eventuate. IEA has stated that they expect countries to implement more 
policies than in the Current Policies scenario in subsequent years and that their central 
scenario is now the New Policies scenario (IEA 2015). One possible reason for 
overestimating future elasticities is that not all stated policies are implemented as effectively 
as IEA expects, and over time there have been more and more explicit policies for IEA to 
  
7 
incorporate in the WEM. The WEM now takes into account thousands of individual policies 
and measures (IEA 2011). 
Another possible reason why both IEA and the IPCC consensus projections overestimate the 
future decline in energy intensity is that they do not take the economy-wide rebound effect 
sufficiently into account (Saunders 2013). Improvements in pure energy efficiency lower the 
cost of providing energy services and thus, via the law of demand, result in greater 
consumption of those energy services, so that the reduction in energy use is less than the 
improvement in energy efficiency. Economy-wide, this micro-level direct rebound effect may 
be amplified or attenuated by indirect rebound, general equilibrium, and dynamic effects 
(Stern 2011). There are many empirical estimates of the micro-level direct rebound effect, but 
there are no good empirical estimates of the economy-wide rebound effect. Simulation 
models show that the economy-wide rebound could be larger or smaller than the micro-level 
rebound (Turner, 2013). Depending on assumed model parameters, Turner (2009) finds that 
the economy-wide rebound effect for the UK could range from a negative value – where 
energy use falls by more than energy efficiency improves - to more than 100% - where 
energy use actually increases following an efficiency improvement. 
However, the consensus is that the effect is positive and larger than the micro-level direct 
rebound effect (Saunders 2008; Stern 2011). Stern (2012) finds that reductions in energy 
intensity are considerably less than improvements in energy efficiency at the economy-wide 
level. The most important countervailing factor was substitution of energy for labor. Van 
Benthem (2015) and Csereklyei et al. (2016) find that energy intensity is similar in today’s 
developing countries to what it was in today’s developed countries when they were at the 
same per capita income level, despite the huge improvements in energy efficiency in many 
technologies, which are used in both developed and developing countries alike.6 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, energy intensity is likely to decline by less than projected in the most recent 
WEO’s despite their using more sophisticated and detailed modeling of the economy and 
energy policies. A possible reason for this is that they underestimate the size of the economy-
                                                
6 Changes in energy intensity are of course not just the result of energy efficiency 
improvements and the rebound effect. Independent changes in other factors and the efficiency 
with which they are used and structural change in the economy can all have an effect (Stern, 
20012; Saunders, 2015). 
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wide rebound effect. This may also be the case for other projections of future energy intensity 
aggregated by the 2014 IPCC report. Empirical estimation of the economy-wide rebound 
effect and incorporation of the findings into energy projection models should be a research 
priority for energy economics and the climate policy community. 
Data 
I used the BAU, Reference, or Current Policies projection of world economic growth rates 
and the level of world energy use from each WEO for each sub-period and specific year that 
they were given, respectively. WEO-1999 did not report specific quantities of projected 
future energy use but did state that energy use was expected to rise by 65% by 2020 and that 
the same economic growth rate projections were used as in WEO-1998. For WEO-1995 and 
WEO-1996, I used the “capacity constraints” scenario, which assumes historical trends in 
energy efficiency. In the case of WEO-1996, where separate market (MER) and purchasing 
power parity (PPP) exchange rate economic growth rate projections were given, I use the PPP 
growth rate. WEO-1994 and WEO-1995 give only a MER world economic growth rate. This 
is 0.1% p.a. lower than the MER growth rate in WEO-1996 in 1995 and 0.3% p.a. lower in 
1994 and so I assume that the respective PPP growth rates are also 0.1% and 0.3% p.a. lower. 
I used actual world GDP in 2011 PPP dollars from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators for the base year of the projections in the report and projected GDP at future dates 
using the given growth rates. I then divided the projected energy use at each future date by 
projected GDP to give projected energy intensity. I then computed the growth rate of energy 
intensity in each future sub-period. 
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Figure 1. World Energy Outlook 2016 Energy Intensity Projections vs Recent History 
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Figure 2. Energy Intensity Projection Errors 
 
Notes: The dates refer to the publication date of the WEO. The percentage error is the mean 
annual difference between the percentage rate of change in actual energy intensity and 
projected energy intensity from the base year of the respective WEO through 2015 for WEO-
1998 forward. Positive values, therefore, indicate that energy intensity declined by less than 
expected and so the level of energy intensity was higher than projected in 2015 (2010 for 
WEO-1994 to WEO-1996). Because the base year of WEO-2015 is 2013 and of WEO-2016 is 
2014 it is possible to compute a projection error for these two latest reports. 
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Figure 3. Actual and Projected Elasticities of Energy Intensity with Respect to 
Economic Growth 
 
Notes: The dates refer to the publication date of the WEO. Both elasticities are computed 
from the base year of the WEO through 2015 for WEO-1998 forward using. For WEO-1994 
to WEO-1996 the projection error is computed through 2010. 
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Figure 4. Decomposition of Projection Errors 
 
Notes: The dates refer to the publication date of the WEO. Total error is equal to the 
projection error in Figure 2, which is the sum of the errors due to incorrect projection of the 
elasticity of energy intensity with respect to the rate of economic growth and incorrect 
projection of the rate of economic growth. 
 
